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THE FIRST UK EEC MEMBERSHIP REFERENDUM
OF 1975
A When did the UK enter the EEC?
Founded in 1958, the European Economic Com-
munity enlarged to include the United Kingdom on
1 January 1973. The UK entered along with Den-
mark and Ireland in the first ever enlargement of
the EEC. For the UK, it was a rather belated
entrance, since the UK had applied twice before,
in 1961 and 1967, suffering French president
Charles de Gaulle’s veto on both occasions.
At the beginning of European integration in the
early 1950s, the UK had the choice on several
occasions to participate as a founding member,
but each time declined to do so. Throughout the
1950s and up to the present day, the reasons for
this UK opposition were similar: the question of
the UK’s world role and its relationship with Com-
monwealth countries; a preference for loose inter-
governmental mechanisms over supranational
integration; a greater interest in free trade over
economic organisation and sectoral policies (Mil-
ward, 2002; Young, 2000). 
The UK refused to join the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) in 1951. The ECSC is often con-
sidered the postwar starting point of European
integration because it introduced an important
institutional novelty, that of supranational institu-
tions. It also marked a formal step in the post-
second world war Franco-German reconciliation.
The UK government was sceptical of the new
supranational High Authority (an embryo of
today’s European Commission) and of European
coordination in the field, and had misgivings about
the greater political ambitions included in the
Schuman Declaration of May 1950, which pro-
posed the ECSC. Though it was invited, the UK
therefore refused to join the ECSC.
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Invited again to join the EEC on its formation, the
UK also declined. The Messina conference of June
1955 explored ways in which European
economies could deepen their cooperation. The
Messina conference also created an intergovern-
mental committee, chaired by Belgian foreign min-
ister Paul-Henri Spaak, that was tasked with
drafting the basis of what would become the EEC
(July 1955-April 1956). The Committee published
its final report in April 1956. The UK government
was invited to the Spaak Committee. The official
UK position on these developments was benevo-
lent support, in spite of an avowed scepticism
about any form of integration. The UK government
hoped to steer the negotiations in the way it
favoured but proved incapable of doing so, and it
did not think the negotiations would succeed.
Showing little interest in the discussions, the UK
government sent a low-level civil servant – Board
of Trade under-secretary Russell Bretherton – to
such a critical ministerial meeting. The UK even-
tually withdrew from the talks and decided not to
participate in the EEC.
The UK decision was based on a misinterpretation
of the discussions in Messina and in the Spaak
Committee. London underestimated the project
that was being discussed and most importantly
dithered between two strategies, one focusing on
Europe (the Free Trade Area) and one global in
nature (trade liberalisation through the World
Trade Organisation’s (WTO) predecessor, the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT). The UK
prioritised looser, less committal forms of cooper-
ation that focused on trade liberalisation, such as
the Organisation for European Economic Coopera-
tion (OEEC). 
But the UK government did not just decide to stay
out of the EEC, it also consciously tried to counter,
if not torpedo, the EEC. Virtually in parallel with the
EEC negotiations, the UK government from 1956
pushed for the development of a Free Trade Area
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‘The two issues that guided UK foreign policy since the end of the second world war – its world
role and a preference for free trade over economic and political integration – continue, in
different guises, to be valid up to the present day.’
(FTA) (Ellison, 2000). The design and purpose of
the FTA stemmed from the UK preference for
looser free trade arrangements over economic
integration. The FTA project failed in 1958 because
of the Gaullist support for the EEC project and the
UK's inconsistent strategy (Warlouzet, 2011). The
UK in turn re-prioritised international trade liberal-
isation over European endeavours. To compensate
for the failure of the FTA, another agreement – the
Stockholm Convention – was negotiated and
signed in January 1960 to create the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), comprising Austria,
Denmark,  Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland
and the UK. But this failed to be of any economic
or political importance.
It was only once the EEC proved to be a remark-
able success that the UK government realised
that the risks of being sidelined outweighed the
benefits of staying outside. The UK government
subsequently applied twice for EEC membership –
in 1961 and in 1967 – only to be vetoed twice by
French president Charles de Gaulle (Kaiser, 1999;
Ludlow, 1997; Lynch, 2000; Parr 2005; Pine,
2007; Rollings, 2008). The vetoes were justified
on the grounds that the UK was too different to be
accepted by the then six members of the EEC; that
the pound sterling, having the role of an interna-
tional reserve currency, did not suit European
objectives (Schenk, 2002); and more generally
that enlarging the EEC at such an early stage
would put at risk its institutional development and
stability. Enlargement would put off indefinitely
the ambition of creating a political union and
would instead transform the EEC into a mere com-
mercial zone. The French government found itself
increasingly isolated as its objections seemed
unsustainable, and as the other five EEC member
states were willing to accept the UK as a member.
From a UK perspective, entry to the common
market was an ever more pressing issue because
the EEC continued to successfully forge ahead: on
1 July 1968, the common market was achieved
(removal of tariff barriers), 18 months ahead of
schedule. The 1969 Hague summit of EEC heads
of state and government then opened new
prospects for integration, including of currencies.
In the early 1970s the UK government applied
again and it became quickly clear that it would be
successful this time. The Conservative Party won
the 1970 general elections. Outgoing Labour
prime minister Harold Wilson, who led the UK’s
second application in 1967, went back into oppo-
sition. The new prime minister Edward Heath
decided to revive the second failed UK application
and by summer 1971 most issues had been set-
tled (Furby, 2010; Wall, 2012). Many factors con-
tributed to this positive outcome: the resignation
of de Gaulle as French president in April 1969; the
coming to power of Georges Pompidou, who was
much more open to EEC enlargement; improved
UK government negotiating tactics; and the
favourable result of the referendum in France on
the enlargement of the EEC to the UK, Denmark,
Ireland and Norway, with a majority of 68.3 per-
cent in favour. The UK signed the Treaty of Acces-
sion to the EEC in January 1972, and officially
entered on 1 January 1973. However, in early
1974, barely a year after entry, a new UK govern-
ment, once again led by Harold Wilson, wanted to
renegotiate the terms of its accession.
B Why did Harold Wilson want to renegotiate
the terms of UK entry in 1974?
First, the perennial question of the relationship
between the UK and Europe served as a back-
ground for the debates. The two issues that guided
UK foreign policy since the end of the second
world war – its world role and a preference for free
trade over economic and political integration –
remained at the centre of the discussions over the
UK’s continued EEC membership. Under different
guises, they continue to be valid up to the present
day.
Second, the UK suffered from severe economic
problems in the early 1970s that were blamed on
EEC entry. The international context was particu-
larly gloomy, with the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system in 1971, the oil shock in 1973 and
1. The so-called Werner
Plan, drawn up by a group of
experts chaired by then
Luxembourg prime minister
Pierre Werner, set out a plan
in stages leading to the cre-
ation of a European single
currency.
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lected from external tariffs went directly to the EEC
budget. The UK traditionally was a big importer
from non-EEC countries, in particular Common-
wealth countries, and as a consequence con-
tributed more to the EEC budget. This situation also
arose because, since the UK had refused to join
the EEC at the outset, it had not influenced the
rules that were established at the origin. A further
issue was that most of the EEC budget was spent
on the common agricultural policy (CAP, Figure 2).
But because the UK relied so much on agricultural
imports from outside the EEC, its domestic agri-
cultural sector was comparatively smaller, and as
a consequence received a smaller share of CAP
funds. The combination of these two factors rein-
forced the UK desire to find a way to reduce an
excessive contribution to the EEC budget. 
Fourth, the strategy of Conservative leader
Edward Heath, who had negotiated entry, was
heavily criticised by the Labour party before and
during the 1974 general election campaign.
Heath’s strategy was to improve the terms of entry
through internal negotiations inside the EEC
framework. In particular, he had placed much hope
in the eventual creation of a European regional
fund. But closely linked to the ongoing discus-
sions on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)1
and facing German opposition, the regional fund
could not be created as quickly as the UK govern-
ment hoped. While it was in opposition before the
1974 general election, there was extensive
the subsequent recession of 1973-75. Rising
inflation, a deteriorating trade balance (Figure 1)
and multiple strikes throughout the country char-
acterised the early 1970s. Despite their multiple
origins, all these difficulties were too easily
blamed on the UK's entry to the EEC in 1973.
Third, the UK claimed that it paid a disproportion-
ate contribution to the EEC budget. Under the
EEC's system of own resources, the revenues col-
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Figure 1: The UK’s economic problems in the
early 1970s
Source: Upper panel: World Bank. Lower panel: European
Commission, annual macro-economic database.
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Figure 2: EEC expenditure, 1970-75
Source: EU budget 2008 financial report. Note: EAGGF =
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(common agricultural policy); ESF: European Social Fund;
ERDF: European Regional Development Fund; EDF: European
Development Fund.
BOX 1: THE 1974 LABOUR PARTY MANIFESTO
“If re-negotiations are successful, it is the policy
of the Labour Party that, in view of the unique
importance of the decision, the people should
have the right to decide the issue through a Gen-
eral Election or a Consultative Referendum. If
these two tests are passed, a successful rene-
gotiation and the expressed approval of the
majority of the British people, then we shall be
ready to play our full part in developing a new
and wider Europe. If re-negotiations do not suc-
ceed, we shall not regard the Treaty obligations
as binding upon us. We shall then put to the
British people the reasons why we find the new
terms unacceptable, and consult them on the
advisability of negotiating our withdrawal from
the Communities.”
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2. See footnote 1.
debate within the Labour Party about the ration-
ale for joining the EEC. In October 1971, Wilson
spoke against Heath’s terms of entry, proposed a
renegotiation, and suggested the holding after-
wards of a nationwide referendum on continued
membership, were his party to win the election.
The Labour election manifesto included these
commitments to renegotiation and a referendum.
Labour won the general election in February 1974.
New prime minister Harold Wilson thus embarked
on a renegotiation of the terms of the UK’s entry to
the EEC barely a year after the UK joined.
C What did the UK government want to
renegotiate and what did it get out of the
renegotiation?
The 1974 Labour Party manifesto clearly set out
seven objectives for the renegotiation of the terms
of membership. The demands were vague and
excessively ambitious; the results and gains from
a UK perspective were largely cosmetic.
The main outcome of the renegotiation was the
creation of a ‘correcting mechanism’ to the
system of own resources, enforced from 1976
until 1980. However, it was never triggered. The
mechanism was intended to provide compensa-
tion in the form of a partial repayment to any coun-
Table 1: The UK demands as set out in the 1974 Labour Party Manifesto
Demands Results
“Major changes in the CAP, so that it ceases to be a threat
to world trade in food products, and so that low-cost
producers outside Europe can continue to have access
to the British food market.”
None
“New and fairer methods of financing the Community
budget. (...) We would be ready to contribute to
Community finances only such sums as were fair in
relation to what is paid and what is received by other
member countries.”
Creation of a ‘correcting mechanism’ approved at the
Dublin European Council in March 1975. Never triggered
in reality.
Withdrawal from EMU proposals Werner Plan implementation
2 already halted by the time
Wilson took power. 
“Retention by Parliament of those powers over the British
economy needed to pursue effective regional, industrial
and fiscal policies.”
No concrete outcome. Creation of the European Regional
Development Fund, but this was chiefly driven by Ireland
and Italy.
“Agreement on capital movements which protects our
balance of payments and full employment policies.” Nothing concrete.
“No harmonisation of VAT that would require us to tax
necessities.” No harmonisation. But not really planned anyway.
Safeguarding “of the economic interests of the
Commonwealth and the developing countries.”
Better access to EEC markets for New Zealand butter but
not lamb.
Source: Bruegel.
BOX 2: HOW WAS THE CORRECTING
MECHANISM MEANT TO WORK?
Enforced from 1976 until 1980, the ‘correcting
mechanism’ or ‘financial mechanism’ (Regula-
tion 1172/76) was based on three indicators
that should be triggered simultaneously in order
to provide compensation for a member state
that would be a net contributor to the budget:
• The member state’s per capita GNP should be
below 85 percent of the EEC average (mea-
sured as a moving average over the three pre-
ceding years);
• Its rate of growth in real terms should be less
than 120 percent of the EEC average (mea-
sured as a moving average over the three pre-
ceding years); 
• Its own resources payments should exceed
by more than 10 percent its share of the EEC’s
total GNP
The final corrective formula was capped at 250
million European Units of Account (EUA). In
1975, the EEC’s total revenues amounted to
6297.8 million EUA. The financial mechanism
was further amended in 1980 (European Com-
mission, 1981).
3. UK National Archives, CAB
128/56, Meeting of Cabinet,
18 March 1975, available
online:
http://filestore.nation-
alarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/larg
e/cab-128-56.pdf. 
4. The seven dissenting
ministers were Tony Benn
(Secretary of State for
Industry), Michael Foot
(Employment), Eric Varley
(Energy), Peter Shore
(Trade), John Silkin (Plan-
ning and Local Govern-
ment), Barbara Castle
(Social Services) and
William Ross (Scotland).
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resulted in a large majority for the ‘yes’ (67.23
percent yes, 32.77 percent no, 64 percent
turnout).
E What were the consequences of the
referendum?
The first, short-term consequence of the vote to
stay in the EEC was immense relief in Brussels
and in member states’ capitals. The news that the
UK would stay in the EEC provided much comfort
to European policymakers who were otherwise
contemplating many bleak economic and institu-
tional questions (Mourlon-Druol, 2012). At the
same time, the Community agenda could move on
to something else other than just the UK question.
For a year, debates in the EEC had been dominated
by the question mark over UK participation, and
by highly technical discussions about the func-
tioning of the EEC budget. After the referendum,
the EEC could start thinking again about the pres-
ent and future of European integration with nine
fully-engaged members.
But in the following years it became clear that the
renegotiation process had profoundly undermined
the UK's standing in the EEC. The discrepancy
between the very vocal demands of Wilson and
the actual results of the renegotiations severely
eroded the credibility of UK policymakers in Brus-
sels and in many European capitals. The referen-
dum also revealed another inconsistency. Once
the referendum was over, the UK government
claimed that it was now fully committed to the EEC.
“The United Kingdom is now completely engaged
in Europe,” declared Wilson at the beginning of his
intervention at the European Council of July 1975
in Brussels. But it very soon became clear that it
was not the case, and that all the problems that
had been on the negotiating table were still unset-
tled from a UK perspective. This was most evident
in the negotiations over the creation of the Euro-
pean Monetary System in 1977-78: while the UK
government claimed it was taking a full construc-
tive part in the discussions, it was clear that it did
not intend to participate (Mourlon-Druol, 2012).
In the longer-term, the 1975 referendum did not
resolve the issue because of its deep domestic
political roots. The UK budgetary question soon
came back on the EEC agenda during the 1980s
try bearing an “unacceptable financial burden” of
VAT-based contributions to the EEC budget (Euro-
pean Commission, 1981 and 2008). The wording
was critical: the other EEC member states – espe-
cially Germany and France – categorically refused
the creation of a mechanism that would apply only
to the UK, and would thus undermine the univer-
sality of the system of own resources. The second
most important outcome of the renegotiation of
terms was better access to EEC markets for New
Zealand butter, but not lamb. Third, the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created
in 1975, but its creation could hardly be attributed
to the UK renegotiation only.
Most UK demands remained unanswered. The CAP
was not reformed. The withdrawal of EMU propos-
als did not have to happen since the implementa-
tion of the Werner plan had already stalled in early
1974. The list of powers that the UK parliament
should retain was so vague that no concrete out-
come can be determined. The issues of capital
movements and VAT harmonisation were not really
discussed.
D How did the referendum play out?
In January 1975, Wilson announced that the ref-
erendum on continued EEC membership would
take place no later than in June of the same year.
The consultation was the first ever nationwide ref-
erendum held in the UK. The Labour Party
remained split on the issue: in March 1975 the
Labour government recommended staying in the
EEC, while the party recommended leaving a
month later. But the government’s official stance
should not hide that even the government itself
was split. Wilson exceptionally allowed govern-
ment ministers to differ from the government rec-
ommendation and vote following their
consciences3. Sixteen members voted in favour of
remaining in the EEC, while seven voted against4.
The referendum question was: “The Government
have announced the results of the re-negotiation
of the United Kingdom’s terms of membership of
the European Community. Do you think that the
United Kingdom should remain part of the Euro-
pean Community (the Common Market)?”
The referendum was held on 6 June 1975 and
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5. In the chapter ‘Controlled
immigration that benefits
Britain’, pages 29-30.
6. In the chapter ‘Real
change in our relationship
with the European Union’,
pages 72-73.
festo contained detailed demands about the free-
dom of movement5, followed by a fairly vague list
of items, even vaguer than those of the 1974
Labour Party manifesto6. But the detailed
demands on EU migration increase the risk of the
renegotiation because they will make it easier to
see whether the government has obtained what it
wanted or not.
B Skillful political marketing can decide the
outcome of the referendum
The 1974-75 renegotiations did not bring sub-
stantial gains to the UK government; and the few
that had been achieved were very minimal com-
pared to the ambitions. UK policymakers mostly
geared their attention to their domestic political
scene. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear
that both Wilson and UK foreign secretary Jim
Callaghan wanted the UK to stay in the EEC from
the outset. The various outbursts of Wilson or
Callaghan were mostly designed for a domestic
audience. The skilful presentation of the renegoti-
ations result, rather than their actual outcome,
under prime minister Margaret Thatcher. The 1983
Labour Party manifesto called for withdrawal from
the EEC. In different guises, the difficult relation-
ship between the UK and the EEC/EU has
remained a permanent feature ever since, in par-
ticular with the multiple exceptions and opt-outs
that the UK government has sought and obtained.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The context has considerably changed between
the 1975 referendum and the referendum to
come, but the 1975 renegotiation sheds some
light on the present discussions in a number of
ways. The EEC has become the European Union: a
larger, more integrated and more complex polity
with new competences. The existence of the euro
area is clearly reviving UK concerns about being
sidelined by a major European continental devel-
opment. The euro-area crisis and the ongoing
reforms in the direction of greater integration only
nurture this anxiety. The upcoming negotiations
are unlikely to focus on budgetary issues as they
did in the 1970s and 1980s, but they will be about
“the terms of membership” as in 1975, and more
broadly about the claim to re-work the functioning
of the EU.
A How much the UK government can get out of
the negotiations, especially about potential
Treaty change, is very uncertain
The 1974-75 renegotiations made plain the dis-
crepancy between the aspirations and results of
the talks. Even more problematic, the UK govern-
ment had little idea in 1974-75 how the ambitious
demands outlined in the Labour Party manifesto
could be met in practice (Haeussler, 2014). Some
of the demands outlined in the Labour party man-
ifesto, such as those on capital movements and
the retention of some powers by the UK parlia-
ment, would have required treaty changes. Other
demands – such as those related to EMU and to
the discussions about to the longer-term transfor-
mation of the EEC into a full-fledged European
Union with greater competences – merely
reflected a general unease within the UK govern-
ment about European integration in general, and
could not really be materialised. In turn, the UK’s
partners were unsure about the seriousness of the
UK position. The 2015 Conservative Party Mani-
BOX 3: THE UK DEMANDS AS SET OUT IN THE
2015 CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO
Changes to freedom of movement rules: “We will
negotiate new rules with the EU, so that people
will have to be earning here for a number of
years before they can claim benefits, including
the tax credits that top up low wages. Instead of
something-for-nothing, we will build a system
based on the principle  of something-for-some-
thing.”
“Commit to keeping the pound and staying out
of the Eurozone.”
“Reform the workings of the EU, which is too big,
too bossy and too bureaucratic.”
“Reclaim power from Brussels on your behalf
and safeguard British interests in the Single
Market”, including:
• The ability of national parliaments “to work
together to block unwanted European legis-
lation;”
• “An end to the commitment to an ‘ever closer
union,’ as enshrined in the Treaty to which
every EU country has to sign up.”
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7. The reports are available at
https://www.gov.uk/review-of-
the-balance-of-competences.
8. House of Lords, European
Union Committee, ‘The
Review of the Balance of
Competences between the
UK and the EU’, 12th Report
of session 2014-2015,
March 2015, Point 28.
9. Ibid, point 54. Toby Helm,
‘Lords accuse Tories of
‘burying’ review that cleared
EU of interference’, The
Guardian, 28 March 2015.
10. Nicholas Watt,
‘Conservative division:
could history be repeating
itself over the EU?’, The
Guardian, 11 June 2015.
(Table 2). While in 1975 Scotland gave a less
enthusiastic ‘yes’ than England (Figure 3), it is not
unlikely that Scotland would this time be voting
‘yes’ and England ‘no’. Both Plaid Cymru (the
Welsh nationalist party) and the Scottish National
Party (SNP) explicitly expressed this concern in
proposing that the UK should only leave the EU if
each UK member nation voted so in a referendum. 
E The process of renegotiations run the risk of
antagonising even the best allies
The initial prospects for the negotiations were
quite positive in 1974-75 from a UK perspective11.
West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt was, in
particular, originally quite open to UK demands.
But while open to discussions, the UK’s partners
were (and still are) not willing to put their mutual
decided the fate of the 1975 referendum. Regard-
less of the actual substance of the upcoming
negotiations’ results, it is clear that the referen-
dum’s outcome will depend on the way in which
the UK government will be able to ‘sell’ what it has
gained from the negotiations to UK voters.
C The UK administration’s internal divisions
could derail the negotiation process
In 1974-75, Callaghan aimed to strictly stick to the
Labour Party election manifesto’s demands. At the
same time, the Foreign Office worried about the
consequences of the renegotiations for the UK’s
reputation in Europe. The multiple reports pub-
lished by the UK government during 2013 and
2014 that review the balance of competences
between the UK and the EU point to a likely similar
situation today7. The House of Lords’ EU Commit-
tee criticised the government’s stance in very
strong terms, in particular over the report on the
free movement of persons in the Single Market:
“the undue weight given to evidence reflecting the
Government’s own position is a disappointing
blemish on the Review as a whole”8. The balance
of competences review was carefully buried just
before the general election, instead of being
widely disseminated in order to inform the public
debate: “We are disappointed by the Government’s
failure to take effective steps to publicise either
individual reports or the Review as a whole”9.
Not just the administration but even Cabinet itself
might prove to be split over the issue of EU mem-
bership. In 1974-75, UK Secretary of State for
Industry Tony Benn very consciously did his best
to derail the renegotiations because he wanted
the UK to leave the EEC (Collins, 2010). Wilson and
Callaghan, who in spite of their public misgivings
were clearly in favour of staying in from the very
start, managed to counter Benn’s attempts, in par-
ticular by avoiding pressing for Treaty changes.
Today’s situation is comparable in that some UK
ministers are openly eurosceptic and likely to
campaign for a ‘no’ vote in the referendum10.
D Brexit, Scotin? English self-exclusion, rather
than Brexit, is at the heart of the negotiations
The UK political situation today is almost com-
pletely the opposite of what it was in 1974-75
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Figure 3: Results of the 1975 UK EEC
membership referendum 
Source: Bruegel, map from FreeVectorMaps.com. Note: total
UK ‘yes’ vote: 67.2 percent; turnout: 64 percent.
Table 2: UK selected political parties’ voting
recommendations (1975) and likely
recommendation (2015-17)
1975 2015-17
Conservative Party Yes Split
Labour Party Split Yes
Liberals/Liberal Democrats Yes Yes
Scottish National Party No Yes
UK Independence Party n/a No
Source: Bruegel
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11. Emmanuel Mourlon-
Druol, ‘European leaders
want the UK to stay, but are
best friends forever?’,
Bruegel blog, 21 May 2015,
http://www.bruegel.org/nc/b
log/detail/article/1632-
european-leaders-want-the-
uk-to-stay-but-are-best-frie
nds-forever/.
12. ‘David Cameron takes
hit as France and Germany
agree to closer EU ties’, The
Guardian, 26 May 2015.
Michael Goldfarb, ‘Queen of
the Commons’, Politico, 26
May 2015.
relationships at risk. The 1974-75 episode made
this plain, as UK demands contributed to bringing
the French and the German governments closer
together. Both the French and the German govern-
ments were committed to more, not less integra-
tion. In a similar fashion as in 1975, the French
and German governments recently showed their
willingness to engage with more integration in the
euro area12.
The recurrence of debates about the UK’s EU mem-
bership generates a UK question fatigue that is
only liable to antagonise the UK’s partners. A UK
government’s spokesman said that “No Brit under
the age of 58 has had their say on the UK’s mem-
bership of the European Union”13. This statement
is in essence a call for a permanent rolling refer-
endum, through which every new generation
would re-validate the UK’s choice to be member of
the EU. While the UK has been part of the EEC/EU,
UK governments have never held referendums at
the time of EU treaty changes to get popular
approval. Instead, UK governments have used the
referendum as a thermometer in order to take
occasionally the temperature of public opinion
about the integration process. For the second time
in 40 years, the UK government wishes to rene-
gotiates the terms of its bond to the European
Union and hold an in-out referendum after the
renegotiation. Predicting the outcome of both the
negotiation and the referendum is a very uncer-
tain. What is certain is that, unless there is a
‘Brexit’, the upcoming referendum, much as in
1975, will not settle the issues (Glencross, 2015). 
KEY DATES
9 May 1950 French foreign minister Robert Schuman proposes the creation of a European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC)
June 1950 UK refuses to join the ECSC
July 1952 ECSC enters into force
1955-1957 Negotiations leading to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC)
Nov 1955 UK representative pulls out of EEC negotiations (Spaak committee)
1956-1958 Failed negotiations over the creation of a Free Trade Area (FTA)
January 1958 EEC enters into force
May 1960 Establishment of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), including the UK as a found-
ing member
July 1961 First UK application to the EEC
14 Jan 1963 De Gaulle’s first veto to the UK application
October 1964 Victory of Labour in the general elections; Harold Wilson becomes UK prime minister
May 1967 Second UK application to the EEC (Harold Wilson’s government)
19 Dec 1967 De Gaulle’s second veto
1 July 1968 Completion of the EEC common market 18 months ahead of schedule
Dec 1969 The Hague summit of EEC heads of state and government paves the way for enlargement
negotiations
June 1970 Victory of the Conservatives in the general elections; Edward Heath becomes prime minis-
ter; Third UK application to the EEC
Summer 1971 Negotiations between UK and EEC clearly leading to a successful outcome
January 1972 Signature of the Treaty of Accession to the EEC for the UK, Denmark and Ireland
23 April 1972 French referendum on the enlargement of the EEC
1 January 1973 UK joins the EEC
February 1974 Victory of the Labour Party in the UK general elections (hung Parliament)
October 1974 Victory of the Labour Party in the UK general elections (majority of 3 seats)
9-10 Dec 1974 Paris summit of EEC heads of state and government: creation of the European Council
March 1975 Dublin European Council; Creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)
6 June 1975 UK referendum on continued EEC membership
December 1978 Creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), UK does not join the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM)
1979-1984 UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher’s budgetary question
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